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Countries adopting voluntary export restraints  a cost because it results in extra sales at below
(VERs) often adopt a two-tier export quota allo-  marginal cost.
catior system. This system involves a "basic"
allocation to the restricted market and an "openi  A rationale for pursuit of the two-tier system
allocation to the nonrestricted market - analo-  can be found in the recent history of VER
gous to sales in one market financing sales in  negotiations, in which discussions of VERs
another market.  between two major trading partners spread to
other trading partners as well.
The two-tier system allows the flexibility
required to diversify exports in nonrestricted  The recent increase in antidumping cases
markets, while fulfilling the established quota in  may in part be associated with the adoption of
the restricted market.  This diverAification  exacts  two-tier quota allocation systems.
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I. Introduction
Non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  present  a  growing  threat  to  a  liberal
world-trading  system  and slow the relocation  of production  of  mature
industries  from  developed  to developing  countries.  Among  NTBs,  voluntary
export  restraints  (VERs)  are proliferating  and  constitute  a  major  element
of  the  *new  protectiorism'.  Besides  measuring  the  incidence  of  NTBs,  much
research  has  concentrated  on three aspects  of VERs.  The  first  is  the
welfare  costs  of  VERs  on the imposing  country.  What  comes  out  of  this
analysis  is  that  because  the  exporting  country  operates  the  VER,  there  is  a
rent-transfer  from  the importing  country  to the exporting  country.  In
calculations  of  the  welfare  costs of protection  to  the  importing  country,
the  welfare  costs  of this rent transfer  is often  larger  than  the  usual
distortionary  costs  associated  with  an  "equivalent'  tariff.
The  second  area  of research  addresses  the question  of  why  VERs
have  been  found  so  useful  and  enduring.  The  rent-transfer  aspect  indicates
that exporting  countries  may prefer  VERs to importing-country  trade
restraints.  For  importing countries,  VERs offer advantages  over
alternative  GATT-conformable  measures  like  article  XIX  because  they  can  be
imposed  quickly,  lack transparency,  and are  therefore  less  objectionable
than  outright  subsidies  to the industries  seeking  protection  (see  e.g.
Bhagwati  (1986)).
The third area of research  derives  from another  distinctive
characteristic  of VERs, namely  that  VERs are typically  negotiated
bilaterally  for  broadly  defined  product  categories.  These  characteristics
provide  room  to  maneuver  for exporting  countries,  yet  another  reason  for
their  popularity.  Thus broadly  defined  product  categories  may  lead  to
quality  upgrading,  a  phenomenon  which has been amply documented  for2
differentiated  products  like  autos.  1/  For  undifferentiated  products,  like
footw"ear  and  steel, transhipment  has  been  observed (see  e.g.  Crandall
(1987)). It,  in  addition there are  low  start-up  costs,  investment  and
production  will shift  to  adjacent third countries  not  afflicted  by VERs.
Thus,  the  possibility  to bypass  trade restraints  has led  Baldwin  (1982)  to
write  on the "inefficacy*  of trade  restraints,  particularly  NTBs.
There  is  however another implication  for maneuvering  because
negotiations involve only  a  few  of  the  exporting countries trading
partners. It  has  been  repeatedly observed that  export  markets  which  are
not  currently  part  of the  VER  agreement often  follow  suit  - enter  into  a
VER agreement. This  feature  of  bilaterally  negotiated  traa.  - traints  has
been documented  for  footwear  by,  among  others,  Hamilton  (1986b)  who refers
to it as  a "domino,  effect.  Exporting  countries  may  then  wish to prepare
themselves  for  this  eventuality  by  actively  promoting  export
diversification towards non-restricted countries as  a  precautionary  measure
against  future  restrictions.
The  implications  of  this  export diversification  motive  have  not
been  analyzed  in  the  literature.  In this  paper,  we first  briefly  describe
in  section  2  how  export diversification  is  typically  achieved. Next,  in
section  3,  we set  up a  simple model  that  analyses  the  implications  of the
two-tier  quota  allocation  rule described in  section 2.  We analyze  the
efficiency implications  of  this allocation rule,  relating it  to the
literature  on rent-seeking.  We show  that  the  two-tier  allocation  scheme  is
identical  to a linking  scheme where  subsidies to sales  in  one  market  are
financed  from  sales  in  another market.  In  section  4,  we briefly  examine
alternative instruments  and  motivations  for  achieving export-3
diversification.  We  also  draw  implications  for  policy  actions  by  non-
restricted  countries  and  suggest that the  recent  increase  in  anti-dumping
cases  may  be linked  to this  two-tier  quota  allocation  practice.
II. Two-Tier  Quota  Allocation  Systems
Countries  wishing  to take  into account  export  volumes  to  nonquota
markets  uasually  rely  on  a combination  of two  criteria  for  the  allocation  of
export  licenses  to  the  restricted  country:  (1) unit value  of firm's
exports  in letter  of credit;  (2) export  volumes  to  nonquota  countries. In
a  previous  paper,  Bark  and  de  Melo (1987),  we show  that  taking  into  account
unit  value  of firms'  export  is  consistent  with  a  government's  objective  of
maximizing  foreign exchange revenues and  will  usually lead  to quality
upgrading. The  other  criterion, export volumes  to  nonquota  countries,  is
often  used  to  encourage  export  diversification.
The  usual  practice  then is  to  adopt  a two-tier  quota  allocation
mechanism: a 'basic'  allocation based on export  shares  to the  restricted
market; and  an  open'  allocation  based  on  export shares to  the
nonrestricted  market. For  example, a two-tier  quota  allocation  mechanism
is  among  the  criteria used  for  allocating rights to export  clothing  in
Malaysia.  2/  Given  that  the  multi-fiber  agreement  is  so  widespread,  there
is  not  much  scope  for  diversification  towards nonrestricted  markets.
Further  evidence  is  available at  the  country level.  Table  1 shows  how
Korea  implemented  her  allocation  criteria in  1985  (Rhee  (1984)). What  is
striking  is the  uniformity  of  criteria  across  commodities  subject  to  VERs.
Furthermore,  Rhee  documents  unofficial  statistics  by  exporters'
associations  suggesting  that  the  open  quota is  usually  152  to 202  of the
total  quota.4
Table  1
The  Export Quots  Allocation  System  In  Korea:  S-loectd  Cases  as  of  1984
I  I  _ _  Quota  Allocation  Criteria  /V 
Co_modity  Country  Basic Quota  Open  Quota
Toxtilos  I  U.S.A.,  Canada,  I  * last  year's  export  volum  *  unit  *xport  price  in  L/C
EC, Swoden  I  * lost  year's  average  unit  * lost  year's  average  unit
I  I  exrport  pric  export  price
* last  year's  export  volume
Ito  nonrestricted  countries
Silk  Fabric  I  Japan  * lost  year's  export  volume  *  lost  year's  average  unit
export  price
Cotton  Yarn  I  Japan  e  lost  year's  export  volume  * lost  year's  average  unit
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  __export  prie
Athletic  Leather U.S.A.  I  * last  year's  export  volume  *  unit  export  price  In  L/C
Footwear  j  I  * lost  year'e  average  unit
I  I  I  export  price
I  I  |  * last  year's  export  volum  to
I  ____________________________  I  nonrestricted  countries
Footwear  j  Great  Britain j  last  year's  export  volume  *  unit  export  price  in  L/C
I  lost  year's  average  unit I  export  price
Footwoor  | Ireland  !  last  year's  export  volume ! in  the  order  of  application
Stainless  Steel I  U.S.A.,  Benolux,I  * last  year's  export  volume  *  basic  quota  allocation
Flatware  I  Great  Britain, I*  last  year's  export  value  e last  year's  export  volume  to
I  West  Germany  I  nonrestricted  countries
8/W  TV  Great  Britain'  *  last  year's  oxport  volume  *  basic  quota  allocation
I  I  a las-t  year's  average  unit  I  * lost  year's  avorage  unit
xI  xport  price  I  export  price
I  I  a  *  last  year's  export  volume  to
I  I  I  nonrestricted  countries
Carbon  and  !  U.S.A.  | * last  year's  export  volume ! e  xport  volume  of  now  commodity
Certain  Alloy  I  I  I*  smail  and  now  firms
Steel  Products I  I  j*  last  year's  export  volume  to
I  I  I  lnonrestricted  countries
Notes:  L/C  local  currency
1/  Specific  weights  given  to  each  criterion  vary  across  commodities.
t/  For  all  items,  some  portion  of the basic  quota  licenses  are  transferable  while  the
open  quota  licenses  are  not  transferable.
Source  Rh-e  (1984).5
In the  remainder  of the  paper, we  shall  assume  that  u,.t  export
values  are  fixed,  thereby excluding the  possibility  of quality  upgrading.
Now  we shall  develop  the  two-tier quota  allocation  model  that  corresponds
to  this  practice  and  derive  tn  export  earnings  and  effic'ency  implications
of such  a scheme  in comparison  with the  simple  allocatior.  based  entirely  on
export  shares  to the  restricted  market.
III.  The  Model
Output  is  produced  by identical  firms  in  perfect  competition. For
simplicity  assume  that  all  output is  exported.  The  assumption  of export
specialization  allows  us to  derive efficiency  implications  by considering
rents  and  producer  surplus. We concentrate  on the simpler  (and  in  our  view
more relevant)  case  where  firms produce at  constant  marginal  costs  on the
relevant  output  range  over  which  VERs  apply. Indeed,  it  would  appear  that
firms  under  most  circumstances  would  be able  to  contract  at constant  costs.
In  any  event,  the  more general  case  with increasing  marginal  costs (treated
in the  appendix),  does  not  qualitatively  affect  our  results.
The  world  market  for  the  product subject to  a VER is  composed  of
four  countries:  two  net  suppliers, one  of  which  (the  home  country)
negotiates  a VER  and  two  net  importers, one  of which (the  restricting
country)  enters  a VER  with the  home  country. The  second  supplier  produces
a good  which  is  an imperfect  substitution  for  the  good  produced  by the  home
country. Due  to  transport costs  and  the  international  law  preventing
transshipment,  the  domestic  country  will face a segmented  market  if,  as is
likely,  export demand elasticities  in  the  restricted and  unrestricted
markets  are  not identical.6
Denotc quantities and  prices in  nonrestricted and  restricted
markets by subscripts  KR and  R respectively. An asterisk  over  a variable
indicates  a free  trade  equilibrium  value,  and  a  bar a  value  when the  VER is
binding.  By choice  of  units  let  X  - 1  and  P  - PNR  1.  Figure  1
summarizes these  assumptions.  The  home  country's export  supply  curve  is
AXS a.,d  it faces  two  demand  curvess DMR in  the  restricted  market  and  CMNR
in the  nonrestricted  market. Under  free  trade, XNR  is  sold  in the  non-
restricted  market  and  XR  in the  market  that  will be subject  to a quantita-
tive  constraint.  For simplicity,  assume  that equilibrium  quantities  are
sold  on the  elastic portions of the  two  demand curves  and  that spillover
effects  due  to  market  shifts  by countries  ILOt partaking  in the  VER  negotia-
tion  are included  in  CM Rand  DMR  so that  the  demand  curves  are  net  demand
curves.
Let  negotiatinn of the VER  between  the  home country  and  the  res-
tricting  country  lead  to export  (C  x 100)2  of XR ,  so that  X. - X  units  are
shipped to the  restricted  market, where  0  X < 1.  As is  the  case  in
practice,  the  home  country  government  administers  the  entry  tickets (equal
to  )) to  the  restricted  market.  Now  suppose  that  the  government adopts  a
two-tier  quota  allocation:  Let  XB - W(-a)  be the "basic'  allocation  which
is to  be divided  equally among  firms  and  0 o 9  KR  - KB  - Xa  be the 'open'
allocation  which  is  to be  distributed  based  on each  firm's  export  volume  to
the  nonrestricted  market,  where  0 <  a  <  1.  The  allocation  rule  for  the
"open"  quota  is  chosen  such  that for  each  unit  sold  in the  nonrestricted
market,  k extra  units  can  be sold  to the  restricted  market.  From now on,
we shall  assume  that  the  quota  is  fulfilled,  thereby  ruling  out the  possi-
bility that  the  country  is  losing welfare.  Then,  XO - XR - XB  and,  as
shown  below,  a  and  k cannot  be chosen  independently.Flaure  1 
Two-Tier  Quota  AllocatLon  System
D
C
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Notes: Area ZGLJ  - Area  AIRN.8
With the  basic  quota  filled,  firms  choose  XR  to  maximize  profits,
taking  7R and  P7N  as given. Profits  are  given  byt
(1)  -XB  +PXo  +  PXNRN -C (XB  + Xo  + XN)
where  C is  the  firm's  cost function.  Substituting  Xo  - kXN,  XB  -B
into  equation  (1)  yields:
(01')  - P1R-a)  +  (kPR  +  'NR) XNR  - C(X(l-a) +  (1+k)  XNR]
Setting 81/OXNR  - 0  in (1') and  aggregating  over  firms  gives  the  equili-
brium  relations  between  PNR,  PR.  and  marginal  cost:
(2)  PNR - (1+k)  C' [X(I-a)  +  (l+k)  XMR] - kPR
where  C' is  marginal  cost which, by choice  of  units,  is  assumed to  be
unity.  Notice  that XNR  determines  PNR  and  Xo and  thus  Xo together with
XB  determines  TR.  As pointed  out  above, in order  to  satisfy  both  the
equilibrium condition (2)  and  the  exact  fulfillment  of the  VER  quota
(X0 5  kXNR  -)a)  an appropriate  rate  k must  be chosen.  Hence  a  and  k are
not independent.
From now  on,  assume t'o% marginal costs are  constant  which
corresponds  to the  case  shown  in figure  1. 3/  The  analysis,  in  an appendix
available  upon  request,  shows  that the  qualitative  results  are  unaffected
by the  assumption  of constant instead of increasing  marginal  costs. Then
equation  (2)  reduces  to:9
(W)  PNR  - (l+k)C'-  kpR
which  can  be rewritten  ass
(2')  PR - NR ' (l+k) (TR  - C')
s0  that (l+k)  is the  rati3  of  the  price wedge  to the  rate  of quota  rent.
With free  trade  prices  set  to  unity,  (1+k)  is  the  price  wedge ratio  in
proportional terms. The  two-tier allocation scheme  is thus  identical  to
subsidizing  exports  to the  nonrestricted  market  at the  rate  k(PR - C')  per
unit  sales. This  aspect of  a  two-tier  quota  allocation  scheme  was first
noted  by  McCulloch  and  Johnson  (1973)  in  a  different  context.  4/
Figure  1 shows  that  the  two-tier quota  allocation  scheme  shifts
down  and  to the  right  the  supply curve  to the  nonrestricted  market  to  NR.
The  equilibrium  under  the  two-tier  quota  allocation  scheme  will achieve  its
intended  objective  of  market  diversificationt  exports  to the  nonrestricted
market  increase  by XNR - XNR. Had the  government  used  a *basic'  allocation
only 'or  the  total  quota,  then  exports  to the  nonrestricted  market  would
have remained  at the  free-trade  level,  XNR.  5/
IV.  Export  Earnings  and  Efficiency  Under  a Two-Tier  Quota  Allocation
Policy
Figure  1  will  now  be  used  to  indicate the  foreign  exchange
earnings  and  efficiency effects of  adopting a two-tier  quota  allocation
scheme. Consider  first  the  case where,  under  free  trade,  the  home country
is  operating  in  the  elastic  portion  of its  respective  import  demand  curves.
Hence  in the  restricted  market  there  is  a net  foreign  exchange  loss  since
foreign  exchange  rents  (BGLA) are  less  than  the  decline  in foreign  exchange10
earnings  (LMWV).  Turning  to  the  nonrestricted  market.  export  earnings  will
rise  if  PNR  is  still  in  the  elastic  portion  of  CMNx. Next,  assume  that  the
home  country  is operating  in the inelastic  portion  CMHR. Then  export
diversification  will  lead  to  a  fall  in  foreign  exchange  earnings.  6/ Since
export  eaKxl.ags  to the nonrestricted  market remain  unchanged  under  the
usual  single  allocation  systein,  export  earnings  will  be  higher  under  a two-
tier  allocation  system  provided  that exports  do not expand into  the
inelastic  portion  of  CMNR.  This is likely  to be  the  case  in  practice,
since  market  shares  in unrestricted  markets  are usually  low  and  hence,
other  things  equal,  elasticity  of demand  is  higher  than  in  the  restricted
market.
Now  consider  the efficiency implications  of the two quota
allocation  schemes.  Under the single  quota allocation  scheme,  the  home
country  reaps  quota  rents  yielding  a  welfare  increase  equal  to  BGLA. Under
the  two-tier  allocation  scheme,  the  home country  still  reaps  BGLA  in  rents
from  sales  in  the  restricted  market,  but  incurs  economic  loss,  AIRN,  from
selling  at  below marginal  cost in the nonrestricted  market.  As  shown
below,  the  net  gain  becomes  BZJA since  AIRN=ZGLJ.  Thus,  analytically  the
two-tier  quota  allocation  scheme  is identical  to a linking  scheme  where
subsidies  to  sales  in  one  market  are  financed  from  sales  in  another  market.
Intuitively,  competition  among firms to capture  the  additional
rents  from  the  open  quota  (ZGLJ)  will  lead  them  to  expand  sales  in  the  non-
restricted  market  to  the  point  where  net  gains  at  the  margin  from  increased
sales  to  the  unrestricted  market  are  zero.  Marginal  gains, (PR-C'),  and
marginal  losses,  (C'-PNR),  are  constant  throughout.  From  figure  1,  it can
be  seen  that  gains  are  given  by  ZGLJ  - (PR  - C')  k XNR  and  losses by
AIRN - (C'-  P ) XNR . Hence,  net  gains  are  given  by:11
(3)  ZGLJ  - AIRN - [k  PR - C' (l+k)  + PNR]  XNR
which  is  equal  to  zero  from  (2)'.  Thus  the.  two-tier  quota  allocation
scheme  reduces  net  gains  from  quota  rents by  (a  x  100)  percent. Clearly
this  comparison  of  quota  allocation systems indicates that  there  is a
trade-off between  efficiency  and  export  earnings  through market
diversification.
The  two-tier quota  allocation rule  leads firms  to compete  by
selling  at  below  marginal  cost  and  results in  a resource  waste  much as in
the  literature  on rent-seeking  developed by Krueger  (1974)  and  elaborated
by Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  (1980).  Indeed,  the  case  analyzed  here,  where
firms  sell  at a loss  up to  the  point  where  marginal  (and  total)  losses  are
just  equal  tc  marginal (and total) rents from  licenses to sell  in  the
restricted  market,  is identical to  the  revenue seeking  case  analyzed  by
Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  in  a different  context.
Finally,  for  a decline  in  exports  to  the restricted  market  set  to
(X  x 100)?  of  X,  it  can  be shown that  (see  appendix) the  relationship
between  the  basic  and  open  quota  allocation  rules,  namely  X,  a,  k  is  given
by:
NR
(4)  a =  - k B(k(l-X) e  +  1)]  X*
R  N
where  eNR  and  eR  are  the  positively  defined  elasticities  of nonrestricted
and restricted  demand,  respectively.12
V.  Political  Economy  Justification  and  Alternative  Diversification
Schemes
The  above  suggests  that  a country subject  to  a VER should  adopt  a
single  quota  allocation  system  in  order  to  maximize  rent. Yet,  as stated
in the  introduction,  countries subject to  VERas  frequently  adopL  ,le  two-
tier  quota  allocation  mechanism  analyzed  above.  The  recent  history  of VER
negotiations  suggests  why this  might  be  so.  Take  for  example  the  case  of
footwear. Shortly  after  the  USA  negotiated  its  OMAS  with Korea  and  Taiwan
in  June  of 1976,  a  number of  EEC  and  other  developed  countries  followed
suit,  often  extending  VERs  to all  footwear  exporters  (Yoffie  (1983),  chp.  3
and  Hamilton  (1986)). If  that  is  the  case,  then  the  home  country  will
expect  a restriction  of  its  exports in  the  hitherto  unrestricted  market
sometime  in the  future  because of  this domino  effect. Then  the  two-tier
quota  allocation  system  provides  the  flexibility  not  available  in a single
quota  allocation system, albeit at  a  cost.  The  government  has two
instruments,  a  and  k, to  reach the  two  targets  of quota  fulfillment  and  a
desired  level  of export earnings in  the  unrestricted  market. Hence  it
makes  sense to  use  a  two-tier allocation system to  encourage  export
diversification  early  on so  as  to  negotiate the  future  VER from  a larger
export  share  in the  nonrestricted  market.  7/
Use  of a two-tier  allocation system so  as to  negotiate  a future
VER  from  a larger  share in  the  unrestricted  market  should  be tempered  by
the  possibility  that  selling  at  less than  cost  in  the  unrestricted  market
may  provoke  the  importing  country into imposing  the  VER.  This  introduces
the  question  of  endogenous  uncertainty (see  Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  1976).
The  exporting  country's  government  would  then have to  weigh  the  increased
probability  of imposition  of  a VER  by the  hitherto  unrestricted  market  plus13
the  present  costs  of  stimulating  exports at  a  loss.  on the  one  hand,
against  the  expected  benefits in  the  future of  having  a sizable  market
position  if a VER  were to  be imposed.
What should  be the  specific  objective  of the  government?  At least
two  come  to  mind.  One  objective  would  consist  in tiking  a guess  at the
expected  future restraint  rate 0  <  1  in the  now  unrestricted  market  and
consequently  expand  exports  in that  market  to  i  (1+0) so  that  exports
after  the  negotiation  of the  VER return  to their  current  level.  Another
objective would  be foreign  exchange  earnings  maximization.  Then,  the  home
country  will  choose  PNR  so  that  ON - NC,  i.e.,  assuming  that  the  country  is
in the  elastic  portion  of  CHNR,  it will  export  up to the  point  where  the
elasticity  of demand  is  unity.  8/
Foreign  exchange maximization  may  imply  scarcity due  to trade
restrictions  or  a suboptimal  real  exchange  rate.  In that  case  an efficient
allocation  would  occur  with  marginal  costs  and  marginal  revenues  equated  at
the  shadow  exchange  rate  rather  than  at the  official  exchange  rate,  and  the
analysis  would  have to  be amended  accordingly.
Two  alternative  diversification  schemes  would  have redistributive
implications  between  exporters  and  the  government.  One scheme  would  be to
tax  exports  to  the  restricted  market while  at the  same  time  subsidizing
sales  to  the  nonrestricted  market.  The  other  scheme would  involve
auctioning  off the  export  allocation rights to  the  restricted  market  at a
rate  that  would  depend  on the  desired level  of sales  to the  nonrestricted
market. Either  approach would  achieve  the  same  diversification  objective
while redistributing  income  from  exporters  to the  government. Furthermore,
these  schemes  which  rely on  the  market mechanism would  have the  triple
advantage  of:  (1) alle-jlng  for ongoing trade  in  licenses,  (which  is14
usually  prohibited)  for  example by  adopting a  linking scheme  in  which
exporters  get  titles  to  transferable  licenses  by proof  of shipments  to  non-
restricted  markets;  (2)  providing a  direct estimate of the  value  of the
rents;  (3)  removing the  arbitrariness  associated  with  administratively-
determined  allocation  criteria.  However, the  efficiency  gains  that  would
be associated  with  the  alternative  diversification  schemes  are strongly
opposed  by  incumbent exporters who  do  not  want  to  share  rents  with
newcomer,
Two  further aspects of  the  two-tier quota  allocation  system
deserve  mention. First,  subsidizing  exports  to  the  nonr  stricted  market  is
subject  to countervailing  duty action according to  GATT  rules. Recent
information  on anti-dumping  legislation  initiated by  the  EC and  the  US
indicates  that  anti-dumping  cases have  been  on  the  rise  since  the  early
eighties, and  the  share  of  NICs  in  anti-dumping  cases has  also
increased.  9/  It is  quite possible that  part of the recent  increase  in
anti-dumping  cases  is  due  to  the  precautionary  attempt at  export
diversification  on the  part  of exporting countries  under  VERs.  Second,  if
the  wedge  between the  unit selling price  in  the  restricted  and  non-
restricted  markets  gets  too  large, there are incentives  for  arbitrage  by,
for  example,  violating  or circumventing  transhipment  rules.  (See  Baldwin,
1982).
VI.  Concluding  Remarks
We have  shown  that  a  two-tier quota  allocation  system  for  export
licenses  to restricted  markets  provides  the  flexibility  required  to  achieve
export  diversification  towards nonrestricted  markets  while  simultaneously
fulfilling  the  established  quota.  But  this  diversification  has  a cost  as15
it results  in extra  sales  at  below  marginal  cost. The two-tier  allocation
rule  thus  results  in  a resource  waste  much like  in the  literature  on rent-
seeking  as firLs compete to  obtain  licenses to  sell  in the  restricted
market. A rationale  for  the  pursuit of  such  a  policy  can  be found  in  the
recent  history  of  VER  negotiations  where  the  bilateral  negotiation  of VERs
between  major  exporters  and  one  of their  principal  trading  partners  spreads
to nther  trading  partners  as  well.
In  practice, the  analysis should be  amended in  at least  two
respects. First  if  the  wedge  between the  unit  selling price  in the
restricted and  non-restricted  markets gets  too  large, there will  be
incentives  to arbitrage by,  for  exasiple,  violating  or circumventing  the
transshipment  rule (see  Baldwin  1982).  Second, if  a fraction  of exports
are  domestically  consumed at  the  price  established  in the  nonrestricted
market,  export  diversification  will  raise domestic  consumer  prices  which
will  attenuate the  efficiency loss  from adopting a  two-tier quota
allocation  systei.16
Footnotes
1/  Conditions  for  product mix  upgrading have  been  analyzed  by Falvey
(1979)  and  Rodriguez  (1979).  Quality  upgrading  for  automobiles  and
footwear  have  been  shown by  Feenstra (1984) and  Aw and  Roberts
(1986).
2/  These  two  allocation  criteria are  found by Hamilton  (1986a)  in  his
survey  of  export  license criteria for  clothing  exports  among  ASEAN
countries  subject  to  VERs.
3/  The  analysis  with increasing  marginal costs  is  available  in  appendix
form  from  the  authors  upon  request.
4/  McCulloch  and  Johnson  analyze  the  simpler  case  of two-tier  allocation
tchemes  for  import  licenses  with  a  single  market  demand  curve  and  do
&..t  have  to consider  tradeoffs  between  welfare  and  efficiency.
5/  This  quota  solution  could  have been  achieved  by an export  tax  to the
restricted  market  at the  rate  (PR  - C').
6/  More  precisely  if the  unit  elasticity  point  is to the  right  (left)  of
the  mid-point  between H  and  R,  foreign exchange earnings  in the
nonrestricted  market  will rise  (fall).
7/  In  his fascinating  description  of  US  negotiation  of footwear  VERs
with  Korea  and  Taiwan, Yoffie states that Korean  and  Taiwanese
officials  urged  footwear  producers  to increase  shipments  to the  US in
early  1976  because  they  anticipated  that a VER  would  soon  have to  be
negotiated.
8/  When export  earnings are  maximized, the  efficiency loss,  a. as  a
portion  of rents  is  given  by the  expression:
_  R "
aO(PNR  - 1) e  PNR
X~ 0\  - 1)
where tan  - AHIAC  a.
9/  Since  1980,  over  300  anti-dumping  cases have  been  initiated  by  both
the  EC and  the  US.  The  NICs  share  in  the  US and  EC increased  sharply
in 1985  reaching  45Z  of all  cases  in both  the  US and  the  EC.  We
thank  Patrick  Messerlin  for  providing  this  information.17
APPENDIX
The  appendix  develops the  analysis for  the  general  case  where
marginal  costs  are  not  constant and  provides numerical  simulations  for
selected  demand  and supply  elasticities.  As defined  in  the texts
1.  The  Model
XR  - free  trade  export  level  to the  restricted  market.
XNR  - free  trade  export  level  to the  unrestricted  market.
- )x.-  X - a VER  negotiated  quota  to the  restricted
marKet,  where  0 <  X  <  1.
X 0 - ay  a=k  - open  quota,  where  0  < a  <  1.
XB  - (1-a)  XR - (1-a)  X - basic  quota.
PR  - free  trade  price  in the  restricted  market,  equal  to  1
by choice  of units.
pNR  free  trade  price  in the  nonrestricted  market,  equal  to 1 by choice  of units.
Two  demand  curves  and  the  total cost  curves are  assumed  to be
single-valued  and represented  by:
(1) Nonrestricted  Market's  Demand  Curve:  PNR  =  *N(XNR);  tN  <  0
(2) Restricted  Market's  Demand  Curve: PR - OR(XR);  t  <  °
(3) Total  Cost  Curve: C =  CMX)  -;  XNR  +  XR;  C  >  0;  C  >  018
Assume  that  the  quota  is  binding. When the  two-tier quota  allo-
cation  is  in effect. 0o  - k XNR,  and  X - (1-a)  )X  X  4  (l+k)  XNR  where  k is
the  number  of licenses  obtained  per  unit  sold  in  the  nonrestricted  market.
This  linking  scheme  implies  that marginal costs  can  be expressed  in  terms
of sales  to the  nonrestricted  market,  and
S4)  dCIdXNR  - (1+k)  C' ((1+k)  XNR  + (1-Q)  XI
Denote  by a  superscript  asterisk the  values  taken  by cost  and
demand  functions  under  free  trade  and  by a  bar the  corresponding  values
when the  quota  scheme  is  operating  and  binding. For  example,  PR  - #R(A);
PR-  #R(l). By choice  of units,  PR  - P-  - P
Firm  Behavior
Identical firms are  assumed  to  be  in  perfect competition.
Assuming  also  that  the  basic  quota  is  filled, firms  will choose  XNR  to
maximize  profits,  taking  PR,  PNR  as given. Profits  are  given  by:
(5)  1  - PR  BX  + PR  XO + PNR  XNR  - C [Xg  +  +  XNR]
Substituting  Xo - kXNR,  XB - W(l-a)  into  equation  (5),  yields:
(5')  1  - PPR  X(1-)  XR  + (kPR  + PNR)  XNR  - C  RX(l-6)  XR  + (1+k)  XNRI
Setting Br/8XNR - 0  in  (5') and  aggregating  over  firms gives  the
equilibrium  relatior  among  PNR,  PR,  and  the  marginal  cost:19
(6)  PgR  - (l+k)  C' [X(1-a)  XR + (l+k)  XNR3 - kPa
In the  case  discussed  in  the  text,  the  marginal  cost  is  constant
and  chosen  to  be equal  to unity,  so  the  above  relation  becomes:
(6')  "NR - (1+k)  C' - k 'iR
which  is  equation  (3)  in the  main  text. Returning  to the  general  case,
exact  fulfillment  of the  quota  implies  that  Xo - kXjR,  i.e.:
(7)  AX*  - kR R  XNR
The  relationship  between  a  and  k  when the  quota  is  just  fulfilled
can  be represented  in terms  of the  elasticities  of the  demand  and  supply
curves. Linearizing  around  free  trade  equilibrium,  we obtain  the  following
expressions  for  PR,  PNR  C  (XNR  +  XR):
~ ~  ~;  ,  R) +  *
(8)  'FR  [1)  R /e  +  R
- (XNR  XNR)  PNR  *
NR  NR
X  NRe
(10)  C' (XNR  +  XR)  R  NR  a  NR  XR)  p
C  (XN +)20
where  ef  is  the  elasticity of  supply and  CNR  ond  ER  are  the  positively
defined  elasticities  of  nonrestricted  demand  and  restricted  demand,
respectively.
Substitution  of (9)-(10)  into (6)  after  setting P* - P  - 1
gives  the  following relation between a  and  k  when  the  quota  is  just
fulfilled:
(1  )  +  (  +k)  (k+a)  - k(X-l)
<  e8  ~~~k(i+Nx  w
In the  constant  marginal  cost  case,  eS  s  U,  and  expression  (11)  reduces  to
(12)  - k  [k  (l-X)  _  M  +  1]  XNR
which  is  equation  (4)  in  the  main text.
The  equilibrium  for  a two-tier  quota  allocation  scheme  when  k-i is
illustrated  in  figure  Al.  Free  trade  equilibrium  is  at A.  The  value  of
k=l  implies  that  the  basic  quota  is equal  to  XNRXR  where  OXR  is the  total
quota,  and  OXNR  is the  open  quota. At the  equilibrium,  the  new  marginal
cost  is  OC'  with  value  determined  by  equation  (6')  and  the  linking  scheme
insures  that  the  value  of  rents associated  with  sales  on the  open  quota
allocation  (area  abcf)  is  equal  to  the  value  of the  losses  from  selling  in
the  unrestricted  market  at below  cost (area  fcde).
In the  increasing  cost case  developed here,  a two-tier  quota
allocation  scheme  will  provide  an indication  of relative  costs  in the  event
that  costs  differ  among producers.  Allocating the  *open  quota'  on the
basis  of sales  in  unrestricted  markets favors  low  cost  of  producers. This21
Fizure  Al
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Note:  area abcf - area fcde22
is  in the interest  of the home country  since the cost of  sales  to
restricted  markets  is  minimized.
2. Welfare  Estimhtes
We  can  now  provide  estimates  of  the  welfare  implications  of  a  two-
tier  quota  allocation  scheme  under different  parameter  values.  In  the
absence  of  domestic  consumption,  welfare,  V is  measured  bys
(13)  W-  TR  - TC
where:
TR - PNR  XNR  +  PRXR
TR  - MC (XNR  +  XR)
In  the  results  reported  in table  Al,  we  assume  constant  elasticity  demand
and supply  curves  rather  than the linearized  versions  appearing  in
equations  (8)  - (10).  The  constant  elasticity  curves  are  given  bys
PR (8')  - ' (R' P;
(91)  /X.  -*  _eN
*X_RX*R_NR  R
(10')  (c$(XNR  + XT)IPR*  es  - (MCIPR*)23
Estirxtes  in  table  Al are the result  of  solving  equations  (6'),
(7).  (8'),  (9'), (10')  and (13) for different  values  of  the  following
parameters:  es,  gR,  eNR,  X,  a. All  computations  use  the  following  initial
values:
pR  pNR  '  1;  XNR  '  O  1S;  X  - 1 
Recall  that  in  all cases the  efficiency/rent  ratio  is  determined
by  the  value  eZ a  which determines  the share  of  the  total  quota  which  is
linked  to  export  volume  in the nonrestricted  market. As  expected,  the
welfare  gains  increase  with  the  size of the  VER  because  the  rent  transfer
is  larger.  By  the  same  reasoning,  for  a  given  value  of  X which  determines
the  size  of  the  quota,  the  welfare  gain  is  larger,  the  lesser  is  the  share
of  the  total  license  sales  which are linked  to  sales  in  the  nonrestricted
markec.
Increasing  the elasticities  of supply  and/or  demand  lower  the
welfare  gains  for  given  values  of the  parameters  determining  the  total  and
open  quotas.  Referring  to  the  Korean  case  discussed  in  section  2  where  the
open  quota  is  usually  set  at 20 percent  (a-o.2)  of  the  total  quota,  a  20
percent  reduction  in  export  sales to the  restricted  market  (A-0.8)  would
result  in  welfare  gains  between  5  percent  and  20  percent  of  total  export
sales,  and  the  volume  of export  sales to  the  non-restricted  market  would
increase  between  20  and  25  percent.24
Table  Al
Q-0.2  a  -0.5S
-o0.8  - 0.6  -0.8  X-  0.6
6S - 0.5  (a)  ed  _  1  W  0.19  0.37  0.10  0.20
R
Ed  - 2  XNR  0.65  0.81  0.69  0.88
NR
es - 0.5  (b)  ed  - 3  W  0.06  0.11  0.03  0.06
R
Ed  XNR  0.68  0.86  0.69  0.88
NR  -6
es - 10  (a)  Ed  1  W  0.16  0.32  0.10  0.20
R
Ed  XNR  0.58  0.67  0.68  0.85
NR -2
Es  - 10  (b)  Ed  - 3  W  0.05  0.09  0.03  0.05 R
ed  XNR  0.59  0.68  0.67  0.81
*  *~R 
Notes:  X  R  1.0;  XNR  0.5 in all cases.
XNR  is total exports to the nonrestricted market.25
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